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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to estimate  the effect of FDI and trade openness  on wages in the 
CEECs in the post-transition era. We utilize a cross-country sector-specific eceonometric 
analysis based on one -digit level panel data for manufacturing industry in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, for the period of 2000-2004. The results suggest that the 
increases in productivity are reflected in wages only to a modest extent, even in the long-term, 
leading to a steady decline in the share of labor in manufacturing industry in almost all sub-
sectors in all countries. Meanwhile, the high significant and negative effect of unemployment 
on wages shows that the labor market is flexible in terms of wage flexibility. FDI has a 
positive effect on wages only in the capital and skill intensive sectors. The results also show 
that the increase in trade with EU did not lead to positive prospects for wages in 
manufacturing industry, contrary to the expectations of pro-market policies and traditional 
trade theory. The long-term net effect of exports and imports is negative, suggesting that 
integration of CEECs to EU via trade liberalization have worked at the expense of labor.   
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper aims at exploring how labor in the Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs) is effected by the integration to the Western European economic area through  
foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade in the post-transition era. Most studies expect 
Eastern enlargement to bring about the catching-up of the new member states in terms of GDP 
per capita through FDI or international trade in the foreseeable future, though the time 
horizons as well as country specific expectations of such predictions differ (Landesmann, 
2003; Landesmann and Stehrer 2002; Hunya and Geishecker, 2005). However this process 
also has differenial effects on different social groups. A decade of transition has brought about 
dramatic changes in the structure of employment and wages in the CEECs. More than a 
decade after the transition crisis open unemployment remains high despite a massive exit from 
the labor market in most countries. The employment growth since 1995 has been 
disappointing, given the reasonable performance of the CEECs in output growth (Havlik and 
Landesmann, 2005; Landesmann et al, 2004).   
 
The labor market effects of European enlargement have been discussed disproportionately 
from a western point of view, focusing on the negative effects of outsourcing and FDI outflow 
to the East on unemployment and wages in EU15, particularly regarding the unskilled labor 
(eg. Anderton and Brenton, 1999; Falk and Wolfmayr, 2005; Geishecker, 2005). The 
European Comission’s Employment in Europe reports in 2004 and 2005 draw a more 
optimistic picture for the West as well as the East, while adressing the possibility of unskilled 
and older workers losing in both regions (European Commission 2004, 2005). Nevertheless, 
the idea that trade and capital mobility play an unambigously positive role for the CEECs, and 
as the skill levels adjust and upgrade, the losses will also disappear, is dominating economic 
policy. This “enlargement optimism” is based on the argument that European integration 
driven by FDI and export orientation will lead to a transfer of modern technology and 
consequently growth that will eventually trickle down to workers.  
 
Empirical evidence, on the other hand suggests that there is no automatic mechanism ensuring 
optimistic prospects for labor. Hunya and Geishecker (2005) suggest that the nature of FDI in 
manufacturing will remain to be low-wage seeking, vertical, export-oriented investment. 
Egger and Stehrer (2001) find that the wage bill of both skilled and unskilled workers 
significantly lose from an increase in the share of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs). They 
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argue that this is because the labor productivity increase induced by MNEs is larger than their 
positive impact on output and wage rates. In terms of wage levels and industrial relations, the 
prospects are also not unambiguously positive. MNEs do not necessarily transfer their "high-
road" employment practices and industrial relations to the CEECs. Galgoczi (2003) reports 
that, according to an analysis of the Hungarian Metal Unions, MNEs match their wage and 
welfare policies solely to the local conditions; even some big firms are union free; and cases 
of threatening of the trade union president has been observed. Stehrer and Woerz (2005) 
report evidence of a downward pressure of FDI on wage growth for a cross-country analysis 
for OECD and non-OECD Eastern European and Asian countries. 
 
The effect of FDI on macroeconomic performance is also a controversial issue. Mencinger 
(2003) and Blaas and Lorant (2006) report that MNEs contributed more to imports than to 
exports, and the spillovers from single firms to the sector does not seem to be sufficiently 
strong to increase growth. Mencinger argues that FDI could also force small emerging local 
competitors out of business. In a more detailed cross-country sectoral analysis, Fillat-Castejon 
and Woerz (2005) find that the impact of FDI on growth and productivity as such is often 
weak, however FDI often turns out to be an important contributor to growth in combination 
with investment or exports.   
 
Regarding the effect of trade, Egger and Stehrer (2001) show that both intermediate goods 
exports and imports of the CEECs exhibit a positive impact on the unskilled workers' wage 
bill in absolute terms as well as relative to the wage bill of the skilled workers. However, their 
results also show that the final goods exports have a negative significant effect on the absolute 
and relative wage bill of the unskilled workers, and this effect is greater than the positive 
effect of intermediate exports. The results of Stehrer and Woerz (2005) for a larger pool of 
countries find no significant effect of exports, but a negative effect of imports on wages. 
 
The aim of this paper is to adress these controversies based on an empirical analysis of the 
effect of European economic integration on wages in the CEECs. We estimate a wage 
equation, which incorporates international trade and foreign direct investment as shift 
variables. We aim at answering the following questions: Do FDI and international trade with 
EU15 improve the bargaining power of labor and increase wages in the CEECs after 
controlling for industrial properties, productivity and labor market conditions? Or quite on the 
contrary, do openness and capital mobility intensify the distributional conflict, and lead to 
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downward pressures on wages?   Do these effects vary with respect to the capital and skill 
intensity of the sectors? We utilize a cross-country sector-specific eceonometric analysis 
based on one-digit level panel data for manufacturing industry, suplied by the Vienna Institute 
of International Studies. The countries included are Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, and the period of analysis is 2000-2004, both of which are determined by 
data availability.   
 
The paper consists of five sections, including this introductory one. Section 2 presents the 
conceptual framework of our model. Section 3 discusses the descriptive statistics of our 
working sample. Section 4 presents the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The wage equation  
 
The wage equation (equation 1 below) is based on a standard bargaining model, which is 
consistent with conflict inflation models (Sylos-Labini, 1979; Rowthorn, 1977; Arestis, 
1986), as well as recent wage curve models (eg. Blanchflower and Oswald, 1995). To avoid 
complications of modeling the formation of price expectations, an ex post version of the 
model is used. We thus look at the outcome of bargaining, i.e. the (ex post) real wage. 
Changes in productivity will affect worker’s aspirations and the unemployment rate in the 
economy will affect their bargaining power. The first novelty of this paper is to incorporate 
the effect of international capital mobility and trade to the model, as factors which would shift 
the bargaining curve.1 The second novelty is to introduce sector specific effects to bargaining, 
based on a panel of 14 sectors for five countries for the period of 2000-2004. 
 
( )MQEUXQEUQFDISQULQRfWR ,,,,/=   (1) 
 
where WR, QR/L, FDISQ, XQEU and MQEU are the real wage, labor productivity, 
unemployment rate, inward FDI stock/output, exports to EU/output and imports from 
EU/output respectively. Different version of this basic wage equation will be estimated, the 
details of which are presented in section 3. Here theoretical predictions will be discussed. 
 
                                                 
1 It has been suggested that a reference wage like the average wage rate of the economy be included. While this 
would make sense, if one were only interested in wage differentials, it efeating in our context, since the average 
wage needs to be explained and not taken as given. 
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Increases in productivity are expected to have a positive effect on wages, and the coefficient 
reflects to what extent productivity gains are equally shared between capital and labor. A 
coefficient of 1 would mean that labor’s share in value added is staying constant, other things 
being equal. Higher unemployment is expected to lead to a lower bargaining power of 
workers, and lower real wage. If the coefficient of unemployment is negative, assuming that 
the effect is economically significant, the labor market is considered flexible (in the sense of 
wage flexibility). 
 
Economic theories differ on the expected effects of opening up the economy. Table 1 below 
summarizes the different expectations about the effect of openness on wages in different 
sectors according to three theories: 1. traditional trade theory in the short and the long run, 2. 
the bargaining theory of political economy, 3.the skill and capital bias in international 
competition argument. The expected effect is shown through both changes in relative 
capital/labor ratio (substitution between capital and labor), and the skilled labor intensity 
(substitution between unskilled and skilled labor). A positive effect is indicated by “+”, a 
negative effect by “-“. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Traditional trade theory, based on Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson theorems, expects 
a positive effect of openness (an increase in the export and import intensity of production as 
well as FDI inflow) on the wages (in nominal as well as real terms), due to the increased labor 
intensity of production (and consequently increased labor demand) in countries with a 
comparative advantage in labor intensive industries, at least in the long run2 (Krugman and 
Obstfeld, 1994; Krueger, 1983). However, these effects need not materialize in the short run. 
According to the short-run versions of traditional trade theory, the short-run results may 
differ due to the immobility of sector-specific capital, which prevents the optimal reallocation 
of production across sectors. This may result in a decline in real wages in the exportable 
sectors due to falling marginal product of labor with fixed capital, and in the importable 
sectors due to a decline in output as well as employment in the short run (Edwards, 1988; 
Cox-Edwards and Edwards, 1994; Milner and Wright, 1998). Nevertheless, once the 
                                                 
2 While the export/output ratio (or FDI/GDP) ratio would have different effects on employment than the 
import/output ratio, their effects on wages are similar in traditional trade theory, reflecting an increase in the 
rewards to the relatively abundant factor used more intensively by the exporting sectors, whose prices increase in 
relative terms after openness.   
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transition period is over, the factors that are relatively abundant in the country are supposed to 
gain. In models with differentiated labor input, the effects of openness on wages may also 
depend on the sectoral differences via effects of trade on relative labor demand for skilled vs 
unskilled labor in a country abundant in unskilled labor. We will also investigate this 
difference.  
 
Political economists have pointed out on the contrary that opening up may also intensify 
distributional conflicts through increased competitive pressures, which leads to labor 
disciplining effects.  This may adversely affect the bargaining power of labor and result in a 
negative effect on wages, for a given level of economic activity, productivity, and 
employment. The shift in the relative importance of domestic vs. international markets 
increases the relative importance of wages as a cost item rather than as a source of demand. In 
an increasingly global economy, even producers of mass consumer goods do not produce only 
for domestic markets, and are more likely to consider labor as a cost factor, rather than a 
factor of demand, and are, therefore, more cautious in terms of their wage policy. Moreover, 
trade liberalization policies have usually been accompanied by a shift in the balance of power 
relations in favor of capital and the deregulation of the labor market, in order to alleviate the 
pressure of international competition over profits. The conceptual framework is developed in 
several theoretical as well as empirical studies, discussing the effects of globalization on labor 
and the threat effects associated with international capital mobility and outsourcing (Onaran, 
2004 and 2005; Lee and Jayadev, 2005; Harrison, 2002; Pollin, 2002; Diwan, 2001; Burke 
and Epstein, 2001; Rodrik, 1998; UNCTAD, 1997)3. This argument is related with a political 
economy aspect different from the short-run arguments of the traditional trade theory based on 
fixed capital and declining marginal product of labor. Nevertheless, it is accepted that the 
changes in balance of power relations do take time, and therefore the effects of openness may 
be observed only in the medium run.  
 
In order to appreciate the predictions of these theories, it is also necessary to distinguish 
between the effects on different sectors. Hence we group sectors into capital vs. labor 
intensive ones, and ones using predominantly skilled or unskilled labor. Thus the following 
four categories are defined: capital intensive and using unskilled labor, CU, capital intensive 
                                                 
3 One interesting extension to this paper would be to interact the productivity and 
unemployment variables with the internationalization variables to test whether the individual 
elasticities are also affected by opening up. However the data limitations regarding the length 
of the time series do not allow for this test at the time being.  
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and using skilled labor, CS, labor intensive and using unskilled labor, LU, labor intensive and 
using skilled labor, LS. Appendix A presents the sectoral taxonomy. 
 
Political economy approach (Bohle and Greskovits, 2005; Gourevitch, 1986; Kurth, 1979; 
Ferguson, 1984; Shafer, 1994) argues that the factor intensity of specific industries shapes 
businesses' willingness to accommodate demands for higher wages, and labor's capacity to 
enforce higher wages and better work conditions. Given that labor costs are relatively less 
important in capital intensive industries, employers in these sectors can afford to pay 
comparatively higher wages. At the same time, collective action is easier in capital intensive 
industries, where a few large firms employ concentrated, high numbers of workers. Vice 
versa, businesses in labor intensive industries are much more dependent on labor costs for 
competitiveness, and the dispersed nature of the industries in labor intensive sectors weakens 
labor's capacity to act collectively. The significance of skills points in a similar direction. The 
more an industry relies on skilled labor for its operation, the likelier it is that firms will pay 
higher wages to increase their workers’ loyalty. Whereas highly skilled labor is a scarce 
resource, unskilled labor can easily be replaced. Labor’s bargaining power is expected to vary 
positively with capital intensity, and the use of skilled labor, and negatively with labor 
intensity, and the use of unskilled labor. On the basis of this, Bohle and Greskovits (2005) 
hypothesize two polar cases: capital intensive industries that use highly skilled labor with 
comparatively the highest bargaining power (e.g. car industry), and the labor-intensive 
industries that use low skilled labor the lowest bargaining power (e.g. textile and apparel). 
The differences in bargaining power may affect how much of the productivity gains are 
reflected to wages, and how flexible wages are with respect to unemployment. The effects of 
openness will also differ across sectors. In this context, the relative bargaining power effects 
of the sectors will be important, with the wages in the CS sectors being least adversely 
affected, and the LU the most. 
 
Regarding sectoral differences, traditional trade theory argues that in a country with 
relatively more abundant unskilled labor, the wage of the unskilled workers will increase as a 
result of openness, and that of the skilled workers will decrease in the long run. If we 
extrapolate the arguments of the traditional trade theory for the long-run to our sectoral 
framework, a positive effect in LU and CU, and an ambiguous effect in CS and LS sectors4 
                                                 
4 We assume that wages in the CS and LS industries are dominated by the wages of skilled 
workers, and wages in CU and LU industries are dominated by that of the unskilled. 
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would be expected, depending also on the effects of substitution between capital and skilled 
labor. The short-run results with sector-specific capital and skills, will again be an overall 
decline in wages for both skilled and unskilled labor in the framework of new versions of the 
model.  
 
The traditional trade theory is also challenged by an empirical approach based on increasing 
evidence, which indicates the adverse effects of capital mobility, increased international 
competition, and the pressure for technological change on unskilled labor in both developed 
and developing countries, contrary to the expectations of the traditional trade theory even in 
the long-run (e.g. for the cases of US and Mexico trade, Feenstra and Hanson, 1997; Harrison 
and Hanson, 1999). The argument of these studies is that the FDI inflow as well as 
international competition, is increasing the skill bias of production, and adversely affecting 
the relative demand for unskilled labor5. Additionally, just as internationalization of 
production increases the skill intensity of production, it may also increase the capital intensity 
of production, simply because of the available technologies as well as international 
competition (Onaran, 2001). Then not only unskilled labor may be affected negatively, but 
labor as a whole. If this is the case, the result will be a negative coefficient of exports, imports 
and FDI on wages in the CU and LU sectors, and ambiguous effects in CS and LS, depending 
on which of the skill or capital intensity biases dominates.  
 
While the discussion usually refers to openess, it may be useful to distinguish between exports 
and imports. Imported goods can be complementary to labor, rather than being a substitute of 
domestically produced goods. Then the negative bargaining effect of the political economy 
argument will not be observed with imports, but only with exports (Onaran, 2004).  
 
In the case of FDI, the optimistic expectation is again that an increase in FDI will not only 
increase the demand for labor based on arguments of traditional trade theory, but that an 
increase in the ratio of FDI to GDP will create positive effects on wages through the transfer 
of more productive technology and better working relations in the firms with foreign capital. 
However, there are four factors that may work in the opposite direction (Onaran, 2004). 
Obviously, the nature of FDI, whether it is in the form of equity capital or new investment in 
machinery and equipment, matters in the realization of the expected positive spill over effects. 
Moreover, if FDI is mostly in terms of stock market transactions, rather than a genuine 
                                                 
5 Harrison and Hanson (1999) also present a literature review indicating that these results are not due to labor 
market rigidities. 
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interest in long-term investment, then the increase in pressure on the firm through shareholder 
valuation can lead to further conflicts in the bargaining process. Second, it is also well known 
that low labor costs are one of the major factors that attract FDI. In this situation, the threat of 
capital flight in the event of a reversal of this relative labor cost advantage may generate a 
significant downward pressure on wages as the economy becomes more open to FDI inflows 
(Crotty et al, 1998; Burke and Epstein, 2001; Harrison, 2002, Rodrik, 1998). Third, it is 
known that even when the positive firm level effects of FDI are realized, the spill-over effects 
can be quite limited, leading to a dual economy, without any major positive effects on 
economy wide competitiveness, employment, and wages (Mencinger, 2003). Fourth, 
depending on the capital and skill intensity of the industry the effect of FDI may change: 
higher positive effects are expected in capital intensive industries, where labor costs are less 
important, and technological spill over effects from foreign firms to the rest of the sector can 
be more relevant. In capital intensive industries the threat effects of further relocation of 
capital is also more moderate, since capital mobility is expected to be more costly in these 
sectors (Burke and Epstein, 2001). Also, in line with the empirical critique of the traditional 
trade theory, FDI may have positive effects on skilled wages and negative effects on unskilled 
wages. 
 
3. Data and the descriptive statistics of the sample 
 
This section presents the stylized facts of our working sample for each country, with an 
emphasis on sectoral differences. The countries of analysis are the relatively more developed 
new members of EU in CEE -the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia- for 
which data is available. The Baltic countries are left out of analysis due to data problems in 
Estonia and Latvia. The main data source is the Vienna Institute for International Economic 
Studies (WIIW) Industrial Database, which reports one digit level sectoral data (ISIC Rev. 3), 
which include 14 sectors. The one-digit sectoral classification was chosen because sectoral 
FDI data is available only at this level of detail.6 Our sample covers only manufacturing 
industry, which is the only sector with reliable time series data for wages. The manufacturing 
industry is accounting for 17-28% of employment and 15-25% of GDP; however, it is 
attracting almost half of the FDI inflow, and generating 80-95% of the merchandise exports 
and imports. Manufacturing as a tradable sector is also most likely to be affected by the 
integration to the European economic sphere. For the years, where data is available, the ratio 
                                                 
6 Where data was available (Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia) the robustness of our results for the effects of the 
variables other than FDI was checked at two digit level (i.e. 23 sectors).  
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of manufacturing wages to total wages is close to 1 (for the last year ranging between 0.83-
1.04 for different countries). Thus the results for manufacturing are suggestive for the overall 
effects of globalization on labor.  
 
Data availability determines the period of analysis. Foreign trade data based on the records of 
the countries themselves (as opposed to EU15 records) starts only in 1999; FDI data is only 
available for a period of 1996/1998-2003/2004 depending on the country. As a consequence, 
our working sample is covering the period of post-transition recovery. The severe contractions 
in economic activity in the early and mid 1990s do not distort our estimations.    
 
In order to capture the time lag in the effects of FDI and international trade on wages, the 
relevant variables are used in lags. This is also helpful in avoiding endogeneity problems. We 
use the stock of FDI rather than the inflow of FDI in order to reflect the long term effects of 
the foreign capital that has accumulated in a sector over the last decade7. In the case of 
exports, unfortunately the lack of long time series data prevent us from using longer time lags 
or moving averages; however we assume that the current level of export and import intensity 
are reflecting the cumulative performance of the sector in terms of foreign trade in the past 
years.  
 
In terms of the effect of foreign trade, this study focuses on trade of the CEECs with the 
EU15, since that reflects a certain pattern of international division of labor and specialization 
in trade between the center, which is both capital and skilled labor abundant, and the 
periphery, which is relatively not only labor but also unskilled labor abundant. The exports to 
EU would be the relatively less skill intensive and more labor intensive goods, and the 
imports from EU will be the relatively more capital and skill intensive goods. Trade with 
EU15 reflects roughly 50-75% of the foreign trade effect of the CEECs.    
 
Table 2 shows the averages of the variables for the pools of CS, CU, LS, LU, and aggregate 
manufacturing industry during the period of estimation for each country and sector. Although 
the results suggest mixed performance across countries as well as across industries within the 
same country, one result seems to be clear: The relatively strong opening up of the economies, 
improved exports in manufacturing and foreign direct investment does not go along with a 
                                                 
7 The source of FDI data is international investment position derived from company surveys, 
as opposed to the standard balance of payments source for the FDI flows. 
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parallel strong improvement in wages in the manufacturing industry. The result is a decline in 
the share of labor in manufacturing industry in aggregate and in most of the sectors in all 
countries during 2000-20048. Even in the period after the initial shock of transformation the 
tide of economic recovery has not lifted all boats equally. In Poland the difference is most 
pronounced, with productivity in manufacturing increasing on average 8.4% per year, and real 
wages increasing by 1.0%. In Hungary, where real wage increases has been the highest with 
an annual average rate of 3.8%, annual productivity increase has been 6.5%. 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
Average wages are highest in CS and lowest in LU in all countries. Average productivity is 
lowest in LU sectors in all countries, and in four countries CS is the highest productivity 
sector. In terms of the reflection of productivity to wages, there seems to be a negative 
relation between the growth pace of productivity and the share of labor in output. In all 
countries the highest export/output ratios (to EU) are in the labor intensive sectors (both 
skilled and unskilled). The highest import from EU (as a ratio to output) is in LS sectors in 
Poland, Slovenia, Czech Republic, and Slovakia, followed by CS sectors. In Hungary the 
highest ratio is in LU sectors, and CS comes the second. In capital intensive sectors there is a 
trade deficit in all countries and, other than Hungary and the Czech Republic, there is also a 
trade deficit in LS, which is an interesting result since this is also a leading export sector in all 
these countries. These stylized facts indicate the existence of intra-industry trade rather than a 
clear specialization based on comparative advantages.    
 
In terms of the stock of FDI as a ratio to output, the capital intensive industries, and mostly 
the unskilled ones have usually been the leading sectors, which have attracted most FDI. In 
Czech Republic and Hungary, electronics as a labor and skill intensive industry is also a 
relevant receiver.  
 
Finally, the average unemployment rate during 2000-2004 in Poland and Slovakia was very 
high (19.0-18.3%), and in the other countries moderately high, ranging between 7.9% in 
                                                 
8 The only exceptions are in Hungary some LU sectors (food & tobacco, leather), and CS 
sectors (paper & publishing, automotive), in Slovenia all LU sectors and two CU sectors 
(rubber and non-metallic minerals, and in Czech Republic only leather. Overall, Slovenia is 
an exception, where in almost half of the sectors wages have exceeded productivity increases. 
But even in Slovenia, productivity in manufacturing has increased on average 2.4% per year, 
whereas real wages increased by 1.9%. 
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Czech Republic to 6.0% in Hungary. In Poland unemployment continued to increase, whereas 
in other countries there is a modest decline. 
 
4. Estimation methodology and the results 
 
This section presents the estimation results for the wage bargaining model in Equation 1. At 
the first step, versions of the wage equation are estimated for the aggregate pool of all the 
sectors in all five countries using a two-way panel data estimation technique with sector and 
period specific fixed effects. Second, separate panel data estimations are performed for each 
group of sectors, CS, CU, LS, LU, by pooling the relevant sectors across all five countries. 
Third, a cross-section model based on the average value of all the variables for each sector in 
all five countries is estimated to obtain long-term effects. We first turn to the short-run 
version, which takes the form:  
 
tjitjitjitjitjtjitjitjitji MQEUXQEUQFDISQULQRWR ,1,51,41,3,2,,1, )/( εβββββαβ +++++++= −−−  (2) 
 
where j is the country index (=1,…,5); i is the sector indicator (i=1,…, 14); t=2000,…,2004; 
WR, QR/L, FDISQ, XQEU and MQEU are the real wage (gross wage per worker, logarithm 
in constant prices (deflated by CPI) and Euros of 1999), labor productivity (logarithm of real 
output per worker, in constant prices (deflated by sectoral PPI) and Euros of 1999), 
unemployment rate, inward FDI stock/output, exports to EU/output and imports from 
EU/output respectively in sector i in country j. U is the unemployment rate in country j in 
time t. All variables, except for U, are sector specific variables. jiβ  is an individual cross-
section specific fixed effect unique to each sector in a country. αt is a period specific effect, 
which is the same across the sectors and countries, and captures the time trend and the period 
specific shocks that are common to all countries and sectors during the estimation period.  
 
Each sector in each country is treated as an individual cross-section unit9. Thus, for 5 
countries, and 14 sectors, there are 70 different cross-sections. Five versions of the equation 
will be estimated. Specification 1 includes only productivity and the rate of unemployment. 
                                                 
9 The panel data technique allows us to pool the data across countries and make sector-specific estimations. 
However, the weakness of panel data estimations is the assumption of a homogenous coefficient for the 
regressors across countries and sectors in the pool. We assume that the variation across sector groups is more 
important then the heterogeneity across countries. The shortness of the time series do not allow for single-sector 
specific coefficient estimates for each country. 
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Specification 2 and 3 alternately add the FDISQ or XQEU and MQEU. Specification 5 is the 
full specification given above.  
 
Some remarks about the specification of the variables are in place here. Real wage and 
productivity are variables that may suffer from unit root problems. However, with short time-
series the power of the unit root tests are low and the problem is less significant in a panel 
setting, and it is advised to work with the logarithmic level of these variables, which we will 
follow here (Wooldridge, 2002; Hamilton, 1994). Unemployment rate, export, import and 
FDI ratios traditionally tend to be stationary, particularly for a short time period. 
Nevertheless, the existence of a trend in most of these variables requires the use of a time 
trend, which in our case is reflected by the period specific fixed effects. Finally, we compute 
standard errors that are robust to the existence of sector specific serial correlation (White 
1982; Arellano, 1987; Wooldridge, 2002).10  
 
The estimation results for the wage equation with different specifications are in Table 3.1-3.5 
for the aggregate pool as well as the sub-pools. The F and Chi-square tests for the joint 
significance of the fixed effects and their probabilities are reported at the end of each model. 
The cross-section fixed effects are jointly significant in all specifications. The time specific 
effects are significant in all estimations, other than the sub-pool for LS, where the results are 
relatively robust between the estimation with or without the time effects. However, in the LS 
pool there is only one sector and the degrees of freedom are rather low. Thus the results 
should only be interpreted with caution. Regarding the choice between the cross-section fixed 
vs. random effects, we work with fixed effects, since the sector specific effects have an 
economic interpretation. Moreover, the Hausman tests for the aggregate pool and LU sub-
pool, for all specifications suggest the use of fixed effects. For consistency, fixed effects 
models are also used for CS, CU and LS, particularly since the results are fairly robust.    
 
Insert Table 3 
 
Table 3.1 shows the results for the aggregate pool. The sector specific productivity (QR/L), 
has the expected positive effect on wages (WR) in all specifications, however the economic 
                                                 
10 Another obvious way to address the problem of serial correlation could be to use the lagged dependent 
variable as an explanatory variable, however that would require the use of dynamic panel data estimation, and 
with the small number of cross-sections (ranging between 5 and 25), the results would not be reliable. 
Nevertheless, based on the aggregate pool, we also estimate a dynamic model. 
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effect is rather small. In most cases the coefficient estimate is around 0.12, which means that a 
10% productivity increase would only lead to a 1.2% real wage growth. One is almost 
tempted to say that wages are de-linked from productivity growth. This is consistent with the 
stylized facts indicating that the average increase in wages has been lagging behind 
productivity increases in almost all of the sectors in all countries. Overall there are few 
sectors, which are having wage increases systematically above productivity increases. If there 
were more of such sectors, a low coefficient of productivity could have been interpreted as a 
sign of pattern bargaining (or solidaristic wage bargaining) where a leading sector sets wages 
and unions in other sector follow suit; or as a high labor mobility in competitive markets, 
which equalizes wages across sectors with productivity differentials. But evidence suggests 
that wages lag behind productivity improvements in most sub-sectors. Using the lag of 
productivity does not change the results. The cumulative estimation results based on period 
averages below will provide more insight on the long-term relations. 
 
In terms of the aggregate labor market conditions, the negative effect of unemployment (U) 
on the bargaining power of workers is verified in all specifications for the aggregate pool. 
Moreover, the economic effect of the coefficient estimates is impressive. A 1%-point increase 
in unemployment leads to a reduction of real wage by 1%. Real wages thus are rather flexible 
and responsive to the labor market conditions in these countries. The effect of unemployment 
on wages may be overstated somewhat since the unemployment rate may also capture country 
characteristics, but since the regression also controls for sectoral and temporal fixed effects 
the resulting bias ought to be small. 
 
Regarding the variables reflecting the effects of integration to the global economy and the EU, 
FDI stock as a ratio to the output of the sector (FDISQ) has a positive effect in all 
specifications for the aggregate pool.  However, the economic significance of the effect is 
rather small. A 10 %-point increase in the FDI stock/output ratio leads to only a 1.1%-point 
real wage growth. This may sound substantial, but the FDI inflow to achieve this is quite 
ambitious: the FDI stock/output ratios are ranging between 0.06 and 0.30; a 10%-point 
increase implies a 30% increase of the highest existing FDI stock. Such dramatic increases 
rarely happen. 
 
The effect of FDI on wages might of course work indirectly by boosting productivity growth. 
Such a channel, however, is unlikely, since productivity increases fail to translate into more 
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than symbolic wage increases. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of this channel was tested by an 
auxiliary regression that excludes productivity growth, but then in the aggregate pool the 
coefficient of FDI becomes insignificant. The effect of FDI on productivity is also not robust, 
which is surprising given the strong firm-level evidence of productivity effects of FDI (eg. 
Hunya and Geishecker, 2005). Again according to an auxiliary estimation, regressing 
productivity on FDISQ, after controlling for cyclical fluctuations, i.e. the logarithmic change 
in output, FDI has a positive effect on productivity only in the specification without time 
effects. However the time effects are jointly significant and their inclusion leads to an 
insignificant effect of FDI on productivity. Although such results are in contrast to the micro-
level positive effects of FDI on productivity at the firm level, they suggest lack of positive 
spill over effects to the sector in general. If we use the positive and statistically significant 
coefficient of FDI in the productivity estimation (without time effects), which is 0.60, we can 
calculate the total cumulative effect of FDI on wages. According to Specification 2 in Table 
3.1, a 1%-point increase in FDI ratio has a 0.11% direct effect on wages. The indirect effect 
via productivity increase would be 0.13*0.60=0.07. Thus the total effect of a 1%-point 
increase in FDI ratio on wages is a 0.18% increase. Given that productivity has increased by 
0.60%, the rest (0.42%) will increase the capital share. Thus the FDI-led productivity growth 
is leading to deterioration in functional income distribution11. 
  
In terms of international trade effects of EU integration on labor in the CEECs, exports to EU 
and imports from EU as a ratio to the output of the sector (XQEU and MQEU) are statistically 
insignificant in all specifications for the aggregate pool. There is no observable short run 
effect of imports and exports. However, it turns out that there are long-run effects that will be 
discussed later. 
 
In the second step the estimations are repeated for sub-pools of sectors according to their 
capital and skill intensity (CS, CU, LS, and LU). This has been done for sectors at the 1-digit 
and at the 2-digit level, the latter excluding FDI data and the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
The results for the 1-digit estimations are in Tables 3.2-3.5.  Overall this does not improve the 
quality of the estimates. The significance of the coefficient of productivity is robust across 
sectors; unemployment is also significant and negative in all sectors but LS. The most 
interesting finding is that the effect of FDI is significant only in CS sectors, and this result is 
                                                 
11 The implication of the increase in profit share on the profit rate has to take into account also 
the increase in the capital stock. 
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robust in different specifications. In terms of the magnitude of the effect in CS, the coefficient 
is again modest. The cumulative effect of a 1%-point increase in FDI ratio on wages is an 
increase of 0.33%12. This means that a 1%-point increase in FDI ratio leads to a deterioration 
of 0.59% in labor’s share in the CS sectors. As regards foreign trade, the only difference is 
that in CU export orientation of the industry has a negative effect on wages, and this result is 
robust in different specifications. Other than that, trade effects do not seem to be playing a 
role in wage bargaining in the short run. 
 
At the 2-digit level a clear pattern regarding the size of the coefficients of unemployment and 
productivity emerges: capital intensive sectors have a higher coefficient on productivity and 
skilled sectors show a weaker effect of unemployment (see Table 4).   
 
Insert Table 4  
 
In spite of the limitations in terms of the sample size, for the aggregate pool, we also estimate 
a dynamic model for the full specification, where we use the first lag of the real wage as a 
regressor13. The results are mostly robust with respect to the static model; however in the 
dynamic estimation with time effects, FDI is insignificant in the aggregate pool. But in the CS 
sub-pool FDI is positive and significant again with or without time effects. The results for the 
other sub-pools are also comparable to the static models. However, the Sargan test rejects the 
validity of the over-identifying restrictions. Moreover, it is not reliable to estimate the 
dynamic specification for small samples. 
 
Finally, we estimate the following cross-section model based on the five-year average value 
of all the variables for all sectors in all five countries. The results can be interpreted as long-
term effects reflecting variations across sectors and countries, though the notion of the long 
run does not perfectly match the theoretical notion of capital mobility across sectors. The 
estimated equation is the following: 
                                                 
12 When productivity is regressed on FDI ratio after controlling for cyclical fluctuations, it is 
found that a 1%-point increase in FDI ratio leads to a 0.92% increase in productivity, but this 
effect disappears when time effects are also added. So 
13 The results are available upon request. We use differenced data as in Arrelano and Bond 
(1991), and 1-step estimation procedure. The instruments are the second and third lag of real 
wage, the first lags of the levels of the predetermined variables productivity and 
unemployment, and the differences of the strictly exogenous variables FDISQt-1, XQEU t-1, 
MQEU t-1. Two alternative specifications are estimated with and without time effects. 
 16
 
jijijijijjiijiiji avgMQEUavgXQEUQavgFDISQavgULQRavgavgWR εββββββ ++++++= 54321 )/(
 (3) 
 
where avgWR, avgQR/L, avgU, avgFDISQ, avgXQEU and avgMQEU are the averages of the 
real wage, labor productivity, unemployment rate, inward FDI stock/output, exports to 
EU/output and imports from EU/output respectively for sector i in country j during the 
estimation period. The average values for FDISQ, XQEU, and MQEU are for the period of 
1999-2003 in order to reflect the same lag structure as in the previous estimations. For wage 
and productivity average is calculated for 2000-2004. The sample is average values for 14 
sectors and 5 countries, and the number of observations is 65 with the 5 missing sectors. The 
estimation is based on White-heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. The 
estimation results are in Table 5.  
 
Insert Table 5  
 
The positive effect of productivity is enhanced; the long-term coefficient (0.34) is higher than 
the contemporaneous effect, but still not very high. This value also corresponds to the stylized 
facts derived from Table 1. The effect of unemployment is also negative, significant, and 
much higher, indicating that a 1%-point increase in average unemployment rate in five years 
is leading to a 3.7% decrease in average annual real wages. The most interesting result of the 
long-term effects is that trade with EU15 starts to play a significant role, but the results 
regarding exports are opposite to what the traditional trade theory would expect. A 1%-point 
increase in export-orientation of the sector towards the EU15 leads to a downward pressure of 
0.51% on real wages, whereas an increase in import from EU15 as a ratio to output leads to an 
increase of 0.35% in real wages. These results suggest that imports from EU15 are mostly 
intermediate inputs and capital goods that are complementary to labor, and not a substitute for 
domestic production. On the other hand, the net effect of exports and imports is negative (both 
variables have roughly the same standard deviation), suggesting that increased exposure to 
foreign markets have raised the competitive pressures on labor in the bargaining process over 
the longer term. The negative effect of exports is robust to the exclusion of productivity or 
unemployment or imports, whereas the positive effect of imports is not robust. Another 
interesting result is that the effect of FDI stock as a ratio to output also turns into negative 
now, indicating the dominance of the threat effects. This result is different from the time 
series effects in the panel estimations. The long-term effects were also incorporated in the 
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panel estimations, but when the volatility in the FDI stock through time is eliminated, it is 
found that the sectors with a higher FDI stock as a ratio to the output of the sector have a 
lower average wage rate.  
 
Finally we compare our results to Egger and Stehrer (2001), as the only econometrical study 
to the best of our knowledge on wages in the CEECs. Their unskilled wage bill variable is the 
wage bill of manual workers, which is comparable to our aggregate wage variable, since the 
manual worker wage bill is most likely to dominate the wage bill of the total workers. Thus 
we interpret our findings about the negative effect of exports on wages as consistent with their 
findings about the negative net effect of total (final and intermediate goods) exports on 
manual workers` wage bill. Similar to us, they also find a positive effect of imports on the 
manual workers` wage bill. However, this is just a side finding in Egger and Stehrer (2001), 
and their focus is the relative increase in the wage bill of manual to non-manual workers as a 
result of trade, and they do not emphasize the net negative effect of total exports. The results 
of Stehrer and Woerz (2005) do not directly comparable to our results, since they are pooling 
a more homogenous group of countries. Nevertheless, their long-term estimation results 
indicate a negative effect of FDI on wages, which is similar to our findings, but no significant 
export effect, and a negative import effect different from us. 
 
5 Conclusions  
 
To summarize, the sectoral panel analysis of manufacturing industries during 2000-2004 
yielded the following results: In the short run, productivity has a weak effect on wages, 
unemployment a strong one, FDI a positive one that is driven mostly by the capital intensive 
and skilled sectors, and international trade none. In capital intensive sectors the effect of 
productivity seems stronger than in labor intensive ones, and the effect of unemployment 
seems stronger in unskilled sectors then in skilled ones. In the long run, the effects of 
productivity remain modest and that of unemployment stronger. Interestingly, the effect of 
FDI turns negative. Exports have a negative effect on wages and imports a positive one. 
 
With all due qualifications because of short time series and at times disappointing levels of 
statistical significance, these results shed light on theoretical debates. The results yield little 
support to traditional trade theory. In the long run, neither FDI nor international trade have the 
expected effect. Similarly, recently proposed short-run revisions of traditional trade theory are 
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not supported by our results. From this point of view even the short-run positive effect of FDI 
in capital and skill intensive sectors is perverse. The evidence about the wage flexibility 
suggests that labor market institutions or wage rigidities are not the reason for the 
disappointment about the optimistic expectations about trade and FDI. The skill bias and the 
political economy hypotheses on the other hand are broadly in line with our findings. Both 
give similar predictions, with the former emphasizing skill bias and the latter bargaining 
power effects, however, this is not a matter of fundamental disagreement. Both theories 
predicted the potentially negative effect of international trade and FDI. The main shortcoming 
of these theories seems to be that they cannot explain the different findings for the short and 
long run effects. However, it is fair to consider their expectations more in the framework of 
the medium term. 
 
Already the stylized facts revealed that rapid improvements in manufacturing exports and 
foreign direct investment did not go along with a comparable improvement in labor’s share in 
the CEECs in the post-transition era. Overall, even in the decade after the transformation, the 
tide of economic recovery has not lifted all boats equally. One possible interpretation is that 
the increases in productivity are to a significant extent based on downsizing and labor 
shedding rather than on genuine improvements of technological efficiency. 
 
FDI inflows to the CEECs have been the channel, around which most of the optimistic 
expectations are built. Economic policy typically aims at attracting high FDI inflows. 
However, FDI does not seem to deliver, what economic policy expects from it. In particular, 
private capital flows seem unable to lead to a egaliterean income distribution. Similarly 
shocking to many economists will be the finding that interantional trade does not deliver an 
increase in wage shares in the labor abundant economies. Heckscher-Ohlin and Samuelson-
Stolper theorems do not seem to rule the development in the CEECs in the past decade.  
 
The results are suggestive for the general spirit of economic policy. The breakdown of the 
planned economies in 1989 caused a swing in the penudulum of economic policy making to 
the extremes of market euphoria. Like in the aftermath of most euphorias, the day of 
reckoning reveals many unkept promises. It is now time to reexamine tools of economic 
policy making such as industrial policy, incomes policy and the EU’s cohesion and budget 
policies to ensure that productivity growth does not lead to a polarization of society. 
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Table 1. The effect of openness on wages 
 
 1. Traditional trade theory 
 1a. Long-run  1b. Short-run  
(Sector specific 
capital) 
 
2. Political 
economy 
(Bargaining 
theory) 
3. International 
competition  
(Skill and capital 
bias) 
 Capital Skill Capital Skill Capital Skill Capital Skill 
CS + - - - -/0 -/0 - + 
CU + + - - -/0 - - - 
LS + - - - - -/0 - + 
LU + + - - - - - - 
Total + - - -/? 
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Table 2. Period Averages1 for manufacturing industry and subpools  
 
Note: 1) 2000-2004 for WR and QR/L, 1999-2003 for the others. 2000-04 for unemployment rates 
2) Average annual change 
3) XQW and MQW stand for export to the world/output and imports from the world/output. 
4) memo-item 
Source: WIIW trade, FDI, and industrial databases  
Source: unemployment rates: WIIW hand book of statistics 
 
 
Country Sub-
pool 
% Δ 
WR2 
% Δ 
QR/L2 
FDIS
Q 
XQ 
EU 
MQ 
EU 
XQW
3 
MQW
3 
WR, 
non-
log4 
U 
Avg ann. 
change U 
CS 0.042 0.043 0.28 0.43 0.64 0.62 0.89 518.7   
CU 0.038 0.048 0.30 0.31 0.53 0.48 0.76 363.1   
LS 0.032 0.100 0.20 0.78 0.44 0.96 0.95 378.4   
LU 0.033 0.025 0.21 0.94 0.68 1.17 1.05 244.3   
HU 
Total 0.038 0.065 0.26 0.54 0.48 0.71 0.77 355.0 5.98 -0.06 
CS 0.018 0.077 0.14 0.24 0.48 0.36 0.66 551.6   
CU 0.007 0.071 0.13 0.19 0.28 0.29 0.37 395.1   
LS 0.006 0.088 0.07 0.41 0.56 0.54 1.03 465.2   
LU 0.005 0.049 0.20 0.35 0.25 0.46 0.39 287.7 18.98 1 
PL 
Total 0.010 0.084 0.14 0.24 0.31 0.34 0.46 386.0   
CS 0.021 0.058 0.16 0.51 0.66 0.86 0.85 970.1   
CU 0.020 0.030 0.18 0.41 0.50 0.68 0.69 794.1   
LS 0.019 0.060 0.11 0.63 0.74 0.97 1.19 817.9   
LU 0.013 -0.023 0.05 0.53 0.45 0.81 0.69 676.0   
SL 
Total 0.019 0.024 0.11 0.48 0.58 0.77 0.82 799.4 6.52 -0.18 
CS 0.031 0.068 0.22 0.43 0.57 0.67 0.84 451.8   
CU 0.029 0.062 0.31 0.40 0.41 0.62 0.56 386.5   
LS 0.033 0.132 0.25 0.98 0.93 1.24 1.53 368.6   
LU 0.028 0.053 0.14 0.56 0.42 0.74 0.77 290.9   
CZ 
Total 0.032 0.070 0.22 0.48 0.47 0.69 0.70 370.4 7.94 -0.22 
CS 0.032 0.077 0.10 0.44 0.50 0.79 0.78 339.6   
CU 0.016 0.044 0.15 0.28 0.31 0.57 0.52 303.2   
LS 0.006 0.094 0.07 0.61 0.73 0.80 1.26 237.6   
LU 0.008 0.064 0.06 0.56 0.33 0.72 0.59 201.2   
SK 
Total 0.017 0.067 0.14 0.41 0.38 0.67 0.64 260.7 18.36 -0.1 
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Table 3: Estimation results  
Dependent variable: Wage at constant Prices and Euros of 1999, in logs, 1-digit, 2000 2004 (balanced panel) 
3.1. Aggregate pool (All sectors) 
Specification 1 2 3 4 
Cross-sections included 70  65  70  65  
Observations 350  325  350  325  
 coeff. prob. coeff. prob. coeff. prob. coeff. prob. 
Constant 6.510 0.000 6.478 0.000 6.501 0.000 6.470 0.000 
Productivity 0.125 0.001 0.127 0.001 0.119 0.004 0.119 0.004 
Unemployment -1.132 0.000 -0.950 0.010 -1.141 0.000 -0.958 0.007 
FDI inward stock/Output (-1)   0.108 0.058   0.124 0.048 
Exports to EU/Output (-1)     0.006 0.885 -0.001 0.976 
Imports from EU/Output (-1)     -0.020 0.643 -0.034 0.467 
Cross section effects Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  
Time effects Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  
Adjusted R-squared 0.994  0.994  0.994  0.994  
    Prob(F-statistic) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Tests  
Cross-section F 408.534 0.000 389.710 0.000 368.143 0.000 337.276 0.000 
Cross-section Chi-square 1601.950 0.000 1495.322 0.000 1568.937 0.000 1451.415 0.000 
Period F 31.578 0.000 23.353 0.000 30.488 0.000 23.594 0.000 
Period Chi-square 132.403 0.000 102.126 0.000 129.388 0.000 103.733 0.000 
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Dependent variable: Wage at constant Prices and Euros of 1999, in logs, 1-digit, 2000 2004 (balanced panel) 
 3.2. Capital & skill intensive sectors 3.3. Labor & skill intensive sectors 
Specification 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Cross-sections included 25  23  25  23  5  5  5  5  
Observations 125  115  125  115  25  25  25  25  
 coeff. prob. coeff. prob. coeff. prob. coeff. prob. coeff. prob. coeff. prob. coeff. prob. coeff. prob. 
Constant 6.712 0.000 6.656 0.000 6.785 0.000 6.738 0.000 6.344 0.000 6.617 0.000 6.405 0.000 6.373 0.000 
Productivity 0.141 0.049 0.141 0.040 0.140 0.060 0.142 0.045 0.073 0.052 0.141 0.025 0.060 0.112 0.050 0.180 
Unemployment -1.065 0.096 -0.945 0.176 -1.190 0.037 -1.064 0.085 -0.767 0.433 -0.691 0.401 -0.587 0.408 -0.585 0.438 
FDI inward stock/Output (-1)   0.201 0.050   0.210 0.053   -0.519 0.085   0.072 0.879 
Exports to EU/Output (-1)     0.038 0.629 0.031 0.648     -0.091 0.394 -0.101 0.522 
Imports from EU/Output (-1)     -0.131 0.190 -0.137 0.173     -0.088 0.320 -0.089 0.299 
Cross section effects Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  
Time effects Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  
Adjusted R-squared 0.991  0.988  0.988  0.988  0.994  0.995  0.996  0.995  
    Prob(F-statistic) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Tests  
Cross-section F 272.309 0.000 267.766 0.000 250.849 0.000 247.334 0.000 808.213 0.000 503.914 0.000 257.272 0.000 232.334 0.000 
Cross-section Chi-square 510.827 0.000 489.075 0.000 503.777 0.000 482.779 0.000 136.160 0.000 126.255 0.000 111.578 0.000 111.209 0.000 
Period F 9.625 0.000 6.409 0.000 9.767 0.000 6.418 0.000 0.550 0.702 0.542 0.708 0.740 0.583 0.684 0.618 
Period Chi-square 42.733 0.000 30.311 0.000 44.085 0.000 30.991 0.000 3.648 0.456 3.858 0.426 5.510 0.239 5.553 0.235 
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Dependent variable: Wage at constant Prices and Euros of 1999, in logs, 1-digit, 2000 2004 (balanced panel) 
 3.4. Capital intensive & unskilled sectors 3.5. Labor intensive & unskilled sectors 
Specification 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Cross-sections included 15  14  15  14  25  23  25  23  
Observations 75  70  75  70  125  115  125  115  
 coeff. prob. coeff. prob. coeff. prob. coeff. prob. coeff. prob. coeff. prob. coeff. prob. coeff. prob. 
Constant 6.863 0.000 6.931 0.000 7.057 0.000 7.064 0.000 6.194 0.000 6.168 0.000 6.230 0.000 6.194 0.000 
Productivity 0.202 0.000 0.220 0.000 0.205 0.000 0.210 0.000 0.095 0.004 0.095 0.004 0.111 0.003 0.109 0.004 
Unemployment -1.558 0.001 -1.583 0.008 -1.593 0.001 -1.501 0.005 -1.115 0.003 -0.869 0.084 -1.098 0.005 -0.838 0.104 
FDI inward stock/Output (-1)   -0.062 0.455   0.007 0.926   0.014 0.747   -0.030 0.451 
Exports to EU/Output (-1)     -0.402 0.008 -0.403 0.009     0.003 0.968 0.005 0.938 
Imports from EU/Output (-1)     -0.128 0.527 -0.130 0.537     0.046 0.461 0.052 0.421 
Cross section effects Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  
Time effects Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  
Adjusted R-squared 0.994  0.994  0.996  0.996  0.995  0.995  0.995  0.995  
    Prob(F-statistic) 0.995  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Tests  
Cross-section F 558.530 0.000 486.641 0.000 739.459 0.000 578.026 0.000 508.778 0.000 425.009 0.000 454.928 0.000 356.992 0.000 
Cross-section Chi-square 373.670 0.000 340.786 0.000 397.406 0.000 355.646 0.000 609.305 0.000 541.598 0.000 598.099 0.000 524.449 0.000 
Period F 4.216 0.005 3.801 0.009 7.830 0.000 6.805 0.000 16.929 0.000 13.188 0.000 11.516 0.000 10.655 0.000 
Period Chi-square 20.384 0.000 18.916 0.001 35.359 0.000 31.983 0.000 67.819 0.000 55.523 0.000 50.743 0.000 47.660 0.000 
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Table 4. Standardized coefficients of productivity 
and unemployment in specification 1 for sector 
groups*  
Productivity 
1 CS 0.3689
2 CU 0.3264
3 LU 0.1714
4 LS -0.0011
Unemployment  
1 LS -0.2670
2 CS -0.3368
3 LU -0.3440
4 CU -0.4803
 
*2-digit, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia
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Table 5. Long term estimation: Dependent variable: Average 
wage at constant Prices and Euros of 1999, in logs, 2000-2004 
Cross-sections included: 65 (14*5, 5 missing sectors) 
 coeff. prob. 
Productivity, log average 0.342 0.000 
FDI inward stock/Output (-1) -0.967 0.004 
Exports to EU/Output (-1) -0.510 0.001 
Imports from EU/Output (-1) 0.351 0.019 
Unemployment -3.7 0.000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.608  
    Prob(F-statistic) 0.000  
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Appendix A: Taxonomy 
 
Capital intensive and 
skilled (CS) 
Labor intensive and 
skilled (LS) 
Capital intensive and 
unskilled (CU) 
Labor intensive and 
unskilled (LU) 
1 digit 
paper, printing, 
publishing 
21-22 
electrical and optical 
equipment 
30-33 
rubber and plastics 
25 
food, beverages, 
tobacco  
15-16 
coke, refined 
petroleum 
23 
 other non-metallic 
mineral 
26 
textiles 
17-18 
Chemicals 
24 
 basic metals and 
fabricated metal 
27-28 
leather & footwear 
19  
machinery and 
equipment n.e.c. 
29 
  wood 
20 
transport equipment 
34-35 
  manufacture n.e.c., 
Recycling 
36-37 
2 digit 
22 16 21 15 
23 30 25 17 
24 31 26 18 
29 32 27 19 
34 33 28 20 
35   36 
   37 
Note: The classification of capital and labor intensive sectors relies on authors’ judgement, 
based on a narrowing down of the 5-category taxonomy in Peneder (20001). The skill 
classification is derived from the 3-category WIIW classification in Landesmann et al (2004) 
such that low and medium skill industries are classified as unskilled, and high skill industries 
are classified as skilled.       
 
